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Precarization, Genderization and Neotaylorist Work
How Global Value Chain Restructuring Affects Banking Sector Workers in 
Brazil
Martina Sproll
Abstract
The transnationalization of financial markets impacted on the fragmentation and 
recomposition of value chains which induced comprehensive processes of outsourcing 
and the commodification of bank services. This paper explores how this translates into 
the sectoral and internal reorganization of Brazilian banks and how work organization 
and social relations are affected. The case of (bank-owned as well as outsourced) call 
center not only reflects changes in the importance and form of service relations but also 
shapes a neotaylorist reorganization of the labor process and the respective modes of 
control. As a result, a complex process of precarization and segmentation of the work 
force can be observed which impacts on new lines of inequality related to categories 
like gender, class and race. The analysis is based on a theoretical approach which 
refers to Michael Burawoy’s concept of the “politics of production” and categories of 
Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory like symbolic violence. This allows an analysis of power 
relations which also includes the dimension of identities. Thus a more fine-grained 
insight can be gained on how transnational restructuring affects redistribution on a 
macro, meso and micro level.
Keywords: Brazilian banking sector | outsourcing | recomposition of work force | 
gender, class and race relations
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1. Introduction
The labor market and the social organization of (paid and unpaid) work always have 
been central for the production and reproduction of social inequalities. However, the 
increasing transnationalization in the last decades has changed conditions for the 
regulation of labor markets, the reproduction of labor and social power relations, which 
in turn also impacts on the emergence of new lines of inequality. This holds true not 
only for industrial production but also for the transnationalization of services, which 
for a long time have been analyzed within national markets and viewed as purely 
domestically-driven.
In this paper I will focus on the restructuring of global value chains in the financial 
sector and its impact on social changes in the Brazilian banking sector. I will reconstruct 
a “neotaylorist” regime of service relations based on a case study of internal and 
outsourced call centers of Brazilian banks. The empirical findings are mainly based 
on my research carried out in São Paulo in 2011 and 2012. In the second phase of my 
field work in 2012, I conducted 48 in-depth interviews with 65 persons, including 22 
interviews with workers of 3 bank-owned and 9 outsourced call centers, 12 interviews 
with activists of three trade unions, 7 with managers/representatives of employers’ 
associations (banking and telemarketing sector) and 5 interviews with representatives 
of consultants/lawyers/research institutes. Additionally, I was permitted to visit and 
observe on-site 6 call centers, two of which were owned by banks. 
Following my articulation of a theoretical approach based on Michael Burawoy’s 
concept of politics of production and categories of Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory 
outlined in the next section (2.), my analysis of restructuring and outsourcing in the 
Brazilian banking sector (3.) is divided into two parts: the “relations of production” 
(3.1.) which mainly include the economic and political regulation of sectoral conditions 
of the banking sector and the “relations in production” (3.2.) which focus on the work 
organization and social relations inside the call center as well as on the recomposition 
of the labor force and the construction of identities in relation to gender, class and race. 
2. Theoretical Approach 
An adequate theoretical concept for this study should integrate different dimensions 
such as restructuring on a global level, changes in the work organization, regulation of 
labor markets, the organization of reproduction of the work force, gender relations, or 
changes in subjectivity. That means we need an integrative concept of labor politics, 
which does not only include the specific economic, social and political context on the 
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international, national and regional/local level but also connects this context to the 
analysis of changes in the organization and regulation of the labor process itself. But, 
by doing so, power relations and hierarchies with regard to categories like gender, 
class and race, thus to different lines of inequality, do not automatically come into view. 
Therefore we need further amplification and new perspectives through interdisciplinary 
and multidimensional approaches. 
I suggest a theoretical concept which on the one hand is based on Michael Burawoy’s 
“politics of production” (1985) and on the other hand on categories of Pierre Bourdieu’s 
social theory like “field”, “capital”, “habitus”, “illusio” and “symbolic violence”. As both 
Burawoy and Bourdieu (to a less extent) do not systematically integrate the significance 
and dimension of gender relations, nor do they fully address racial discrimination, we 
also need a perspective of feminist critique and inclusion of findings of research on 
gender and racial relations (Funder and Sproll 2012; Sproll 2010). These developments 
are particularly important for understanding the highly gendered relations in the new 
service industries which are the subject of this study.
2.1. Michael Burawoy: “The Politics of Production” 
Michael Burawoy´s work, which was developed in the context of the Labor Process 
Debate in the beginning of the 1980s, contributed fundamentally to the current 
understanding of domination and transformations in workplace relations. He offers 
one of the few theory-based concepts of labor politics with respect to a “political 
economy of production” (Burawoy 1984). It allows focusing on the labor process on 
the one hand and on the other hand understanding the interdependencies of the shop 
floor and the regulating institutions inside and outside the factory. In doing so, we 
can integrate the economic, social and political/institutional context into our analysis. 
Burawoy conceptualizes the firm as a sphere of political conflicts and negotiation. 
His basic assumption is to comprehend the labor process not as determined by 
technology but as a set of social relations that are configured and reproduced inside 
the company. Negotiation and conflict regulation always include an imponderable 
dynamic and contingency in which the respective political power relationships and 
regional conditions come into effect. He calls the space inside the company, where 
different internal as well as external influences are conciliated and regulated “relations 
in production” and distinguishes these from the firm-external “relations of production” 
(Burawoy 1985: 7-19, own emphasis). Through the latter, he addresses the general 
conditions for reproduction of social relations, “through which surplus is appropriated 
and redistributed” (Burawoy 1984: 31). He understands regulation as realized through 
the political and ideological apparatuses of production, whereby the state plays a major 
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role. This makes clear that Burawoy’s neo-Marxist analysis strongly refers to Althusser, 
Poulantzas and Gramsci (Burawoy 1979, 1984, 1985). 
Based on a process of negotiation and struggles inside the company and given variable 
historical, geographical, political, social and economic conditions for regulation and the 
specific configuration of the variable internal and external influences, different “regimes 
of production”1 evolve. Burawoy defines the following constitutive determinants of a 
“factory regime” (Burawoy 1985: 17-19): 
(1) The labor process itself
(2) The mode of reproduction of labor power
(3) State politics
(4) The market forces (form of competition between companies and their relations to 
state and market)
(5) The wider political and economic forces on an international level
Burawoy thus provides analytical instruments to conceptualize the translation and 
interrelation of power structures and power relations on the shop floor level with 
institutions like the state, the social organization of reproduction, the family organization, 
the labor market, industrial relations, specific sectoral configurations or the dynamics 
of transnationalization. Burawoy’s concept of politics of production in this sense helped 
not only to politicize debates in the field of labor and industrial sociology, which all 
too often limited research to the micro level of specific companies. It also offers more 
refined instruments for the analysis of interdependencies of the micro, meso and macro 
level what therefore also could be a link to and an enhancement of regulation theory, 
which predominantly operates on an abstract macro level (see Sproll 2013; Bieling 
2012). But there are also some important deficiencies which require some adaptations 
and amplification of the theoretical scope. Burawoy’s concept still appears as too 
monolithic and oversimplified for an adequate analysis of negotiation processes and 
struggles on the shop floor. Most notably we have to state that categories like gender 
and race have not been integrated systematically.2 Actually, in his own studies, he 
privileges industrial, male, and white workers which appear as much as a homogeneous 
group as supervisors and managers (cf. Araujo Guimarães and Guimarães 1991). 
As a result, various lines of inequalities and differences become invisible like gender 
1 Burawoy specifies the term “production regime” as “factory” regime (1985: 8). As I perceive this 
term to refer to a locally restricted industrial realm, I prefer the term “production” regime which 
encompasses the service sector (but agriculture as well).
2 For a broader discussion see Sproll 2010 and Funder and Sproll 2012.
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hierarchies, racial and ethnic relations, the significance of education and qualification, 
or organizational hierarchies as well as sectoral differences. One can assume that i.e. 
in the services sectors like finance and banking or in other fields of work like home- and 
care work we find specific and different conditions and configurations than in traditional 
industry branches. And we can assume that a well-educated, male, white middle-class 
employee in a unionized company has other and better (individual and collective) 
means of negotiation than a subcontracted, black, semi-skilled, female line worker 
would have.
 
In addition to shortcomings in the understanding of the role of gender in the workplace, 
there is a broader feminist critique of Burawoy’s approach because it neglects the 
importance of gender in the “relations in production”, limiting it to the sphere of family 
organizations and social reproduction. Thereby, on the one hand, he underestimates 
the importance of gender relations in the work place which express themselves in a 
persistently hierarchical gender division of labor. This highlights the gendered power 
relations which are constitutive for the technical and social organization of the labor 
and production process. Interestingly, by situating gender in the sphere of social 
reproduction (as part of the “relations of production”), on the other hand he offers 
some important starting points for a systematic integration of a gender perspective in 
his concept as he mentions the reproduction of labor power as one of the determinants 
of a production regime. If we take this into account (contrary to Burawoy himself), we 
have to integrate the regulation of the wage relation, the social (and gendered) form 
of labor markets, the organization of industrial relations, but we also have to consider 
the forms of private households and families, the organization of child care and the 
care of elderly or sick household members (cf. Sproll 2010). In doing so, the social 
gender division of labor appears as an integral and indispensable part of the shaping 
of production regimes, which always constitute themselves as well as gender regimes. 
2.2. Pierre Bourdieu’s Framework: A Key Building Block for a Gender Sensitive 
 Labor Politics Approach
Beyond Burawoy, there is an approach that helps develop a comprehensive theoretical 
approach to labor politics that is sensitive to gender and race. Bourdieu’s categories 
“field”, “capital”, “habitus”, “illusio” and “symbolic violence” are particularly suitable, 
since it not only supplies the linkage between the symbolic level with the structural, 
which occupies an outsized position in Burawoy’s analysis. This allows a more finely 
grained analysis of power relations and inequalities on different levels. The term “field”, 
for instance, indicates a structured social space with specific configurations, rules 
(nomos), schemes of domination, ways of legitimation, representations, and so on 
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(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 127). The specific structures of a field are constructed 
through social practices, more concretely through struggles for positions of power 
within the field. In this sense fields are shaped by social relations and intersect and 
overlap with other fields. As Bourdieu understands fields to be “relatively autonomous” 
from the wider social space and according to his own studies about the economic field 
(Bourdieu 1998a: 188), we can conceptualize the branch as a “relatively autonomous 
field”. It is characterized through specific actors and institutions like companies, lobby 
groups, financial markets, labor agencies, a labor market with a specific (i.e. gendered 
or racialized) social form and qualification profile, a specific division of labor (i.e. supply 
chains, supplier-networks, customer relationships, degree of transnationalization), 
gender beliefs, or – not least – the state politics. Thus, the field of a branch can be 
comprehended as part of the “relations of production” (in Burawoy’s term). 
Similarly, the company as a relatively autonomous field (Bourdieu 1998a: 191) itself 
would correspond with Burawoy’s “relations in production”, but the concept of field 
offers a wider comprehension of social practices which produce and reproduce specific 
power relations. A further differentiation can be achieved by a horizontal and vertical 
subdivision of the company (cf. Hofbauer 1992). In doing so, on a horizontal level we 
can distinguish groups of employees in similar positions like supervisors or knowledge 
workers of an IT-department from production workers, front office from back office 
workers, permanent from subcontracted staff. On a vertical axis we can visualize 
all positions in the hierarchy of a specific subfield (i.e. a department). Consequently 
we can take into account distinctive features in relation to the labor process and 
qualification requirements as well as habitual disposition structures and specific rules 
and games in different departments (for instance in call centers of banks). It can be 
expected that different forms of hierarchies, modes of control, performance goals or 
self-expectations generate different forms of social relations and hierarchical structures 
in different subfields which also determine their position within the company or the 
value chain. Another fundamental advantage of vertical and horizontal differentiation of 
subfields can be seen in the analysis of gender structures. On a vertical axis this refers 
to a hierarchical gender division of labor which i.e. expresses itself in the exclusion 
of women from executive positions. On a horizontal axis we can also take into 
consideration differentiations within gender or ethnical groups, which might express 
themselves through status, habitus formation, distinctive interests and power positions, 
or, to use Bourdieu’s concept of “capital”, the disposition of resources of economic, 
social, cultural and symbolic capital. This concept plays a crucial role for an analysis of 
power relations in all kinds of fields which goes beyond a purely economic dimension 
but also includes cultural and symbolic orders and dynamics (Bourdieu 1997: 49-52). 
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Linked to the concepts of field and capital, Bourdieu introduces a conception of the 
habitus which furthermore helps to understand the incorporation and transformation 
of objective social structures into subjective, physical and mental experiences 
of individuals. Thus, the habitus as a system of dispositions indicates the social 
mediation of individual schemes of thinking, acting and acquired ways of perception 
and classification. These are the basis for social action; habitus therefore is not only a 
product of social structures but generates forms of social practice itself (Bourdieu 1984: 
332). According to Bourdieu, one of the most fundamental and powerful classifications 
is the two-gender-hegemony which induces a corresponding gendered system of 
habitual dispositions. This does not mean that there is something like a “naturalized 
gendered habitus” (cf. Krais 2011: 39). In Bourdieu’s concept, categories like class, 
gender, and race are understood to be relational; their significance and meaning vary 
depending on the related field. Moreover, habitus should not be misunderstood as 
a mechanistic reflection of objective structures, but as a “regularized improvisation” 
(Bourdieu 1976: 179). This means that restrictions and limitations of possible social 
action but not social practices themselves are determined by the habitus (Bourdieu 
1993: 102). 
If we conceive a company as a gendered field, we can assume different and habitually 
induced expectations and strategies of different actors which express specific schemes 
of classifications (e.g. of gender orders or racial attributions). The coincidence of 
objective structures (such as a hierarchical gender division of labor) and subjective 
schemes of classifications is what Bourdieu names “symbolic violence”, a key concept 
for the explanation of domination and its capability to reproduce itself. His notion of 
symbolic violence does not address direct or physical violence, but subtle forms of power 
mediated through language, attributions, gestures, corporality and daily routines which 
are not even detected and perceived as violence (Bourdieu 1997: 217). The importance 
of symbolic representation and legitimation has been emphasized even more strongly 
by feminist and intersectional researchers (cf. Winker and Degele 2009). The latter 
notably have accentuated the entangled construction of categories like gender, class 
and race, thus going beyond Bourdieu who has not taken race extensively into account 
(cf. Weiß 2001).
3. Outsourcing in the Brazilian Banking Sector
After having outlined basic points of a gender-sensitive approach of labor politics I will 
now conceptualize and apply it for the interpretation of the findings of my case study. 
I will carve out contours of a “neotaylorist regime of services” following Burawoy’s 
distinction between “relations of” and “relations in production”. What I exactly mean 
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by “neotaylorist” will be clarified and further explained below by discussing the labor 
process and corresponding modes of control as part of “relations in production”. To 
understand a regime of services we also need to explain the “relations of production”. As 
mentioned above, these include institutions like state politics, the social organization of 
reproduction, the (gendered and racialized) labor market, industrial relations, specific 
sectoral configurations and the dynamics of transnationalization. First, I will draw very 
briefly on the branch – the Brazilian financial sector – as a field of power with its 
specific configurations and changes in relation to the liberalization and integration into 
the global financial system. 
3.1. Relations of Production 
3.1.1. The Brazilian Financial Sector in the Light of Liberalization and 
 Transnationalization
In her important study about women as bank workers, Liliana Segnini characterizes 
the Brazilian banking sector as “a sectoral island of modernity in the Brazilian society” 
(Segnini 1998: 20). She refers to diverse facets of its significance, such as the economic 
weight in relation to its participation of the GDP what makes it one of the most important 
subsectors of the Brazilian tertiary sector, but also in relation to the highly developed 
technological diffusion and the extraordinarily high level of education of its workers.
The history of the Brazilian banking sector goes back to the end of Portuguese 
colonization in the early 19th century when the first Banco do Brasil was founded in 
order to establish a national financial system (Fritz 2002: 49). Its function has always 
been closely connected with the process of industrialization and urbanization beginning 
from 1930. The fundamental reforms of the financial system in 1964/66 and in 1988 
(which marks the period of the military dictatorship which ended in 1984) and the 
liberalization in the 1990s reflect its strategic importance for the alignment of the 
economic development model applied at the time (cf. Paula 1998). The period before 
the first bank reform in 1964 is characterized by ambitious development plans (as part 
of a national-developmentalist model) and economic growth which began to decelerate 
from 1962. This required a fundamental restructuring of capital accumulation (Tavares 
1998: 150). The reform facilitated an expansion and diversification of the financial 
system as well as a strong process of capital concentration and monopolization through 
supporting big national and international companies. 
The 1964 bank reform in this sense was an attempt to conciliate different bourgeois 
class fractions (representing national private and public respectively international 
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capital) and a new articulation between the national and international financial 
system (Jinkings 2002: 46). The state, which at that time also fostered a significant 
concentration and centralization of the banking sector itself, played a major role in this 
process, which also explains the development of numerous institutions of regulation 
and the prudential supervision of the financial system by the state and the Central 
Bank (Medonҫa 2006). Interestingly, while state politics continued to be protectionist, 
restricting i.e. the participation of foreign banks in national retail banks, this reform 
at the same time facilitated the internationalization of financial transactions (Jinkings 
2002: 49). The reform in 1988, which occurred in the context of debates about the 
new democratic constitution in Brazil, further reinforced external financial flows and 
encompassed a new wave of restructuring and reorganization of the banking sector. 
Whereas the reform in 1964 had stipulated a segmentation of financial services and thus 
fostered the building of financial conglomerates, the new reform allowed all-purpose-
banks (Banco Múltiplo) which integrate different functions of retail and investment 
banking (Paula 1998: 5). These changes reflect the growing influence of a financial 
bourgeoisie which placed neoliberal claims on the political agenda, and indicate the 
end of the national developmentalist strategy of the post-World War II economy in 
Brazil, which moreover had suffered from the impact of the external debt crisis in the 
beginning of the 1980s and the accelerating inflation. The most important and dramatic 
moment for the further development of the Brazilian banking sector is probably marked 
by the monetary reform, the Plano Real in 1994, which ended (hyper-) inflation, one 
of the defining characteristics and problems of the Brazilian financial system in the 
1980s and 90s. Paula emphasizes that at the end of 1989 inflation “was reaching more 
than 50% per month”, after the failure of several price stabilization programs (Paula 
1998: 31). Actually, Brazilian banks, in spite of the insecure and risky environment 
of high inflation rates, had been very skilled in finding solutions to realize excessive 
profits under such conditions (Carvalho 1996). The monetary reform thus also ended 
a historic regime of bank profits. 
The consequential restructuring of banks, combined with the incorporation of the 
Basel Accord into Brazilian banking regulations as well as various policy measures 
like PROER (Programa de Estímulo à Reestruturação e ao Fortalecimento do Sistema 
Financeiro Nacional) implemented by the Brazilian government in 1995 and PROES 
(Programa de Incentivo à Redução do Setor Público Estadual na Atividade Bancária), 
implemented in February 1996, led to a significant process of concentration and 
centralization (via mergers and acquisitions of banks) and to a comprehensive wave 
of bank privatization (cf. Minella 2006: 7). According to Ary Minella, privatization was 
also one of the main entry points for foreign banks through the acquisition of national 
private and state banks (Minella: 9). As a consequence and according to a research 
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report of DIEESE3 (2011a), in 2004 the five biggest banks dominated 50% of the shares 
of the National Financial System, in 2010 this figure reached 85%. This illustrates the 
enormous process of capital concentration and centralization in the banking sector. 
The remaining and most powerful actors of the branch are Banco Itaú and Bradesco as 
the two largest national private banks, the two public banks Banco do Brasil and Caixa 
Econômica Federal, and Banco Santander, which, along with HSBC is the only foreign 
bank which was able to establish itself and expand significantly in the Brazilian domestic 
market4 (DIEESE 2011a). This is noteworthy because contrary to the fears raised in 
debates about the liberalization of the domestic financial market, it is predominantly 
the national banks which continue to be competitive. The Brazilian example therefore 
differs from other Latin-American experiences of financial liberalization. In Argentina, 
for example, the domestic market now is completely dominated by foreign banks 
(Carvalho, Studart y Alves 2002). The Brazilian case actually shows the significance 
of a more cautious implementation of deregulation conducted under the accurate 
supervision and regulation through the State and respectively the Central Bank. 
3.1.2. Impact of Sectoral Structures and Changes on the Work Organization
The series of reforms and especially the resulting transnationalization of transactions 
also had an impact on labor relations in the banking sector. Over time, working 
conditions and work organization in banks have changed fundamentally. Liliana 
Segnini (1998: 61) emphasizes the interdependency of these changes with the relation 
between financial capital and the dynamics of capital reproduction. This is to say that 
such changes refer to the function awarded to the financial system for the expansion 
of capital, be it on a national or international level (Segnini 1998). The interdependent 
relationship of the specific strategic function of the financial system and the shape 
of the work organization illustrates the above outlined entanglement of “relations of” 
and “in production”. In the following explanations some examples for this relationship 
in the context of the integration of the Brazil in an international finance-led regime of 
accumulation (Chesnay 2004) will be detailed.
The 1964 bank reform had already caused a significant reorganization of bank work. 
Rising competition between banks, the imperative to speed up the flow of financial 
information and reduce costs as well as the foundation of big centers for data 
3 DIEESE (Departamento Intersindical de Estatística e Estudos Socioeconômicos) is a trade union 
based institute for research, consultancy and education. 
4 The Spanish Santander Bank became one of the leading banks in Brazil through the purchase of 
banks like Banespa and ABN AMRO. HSBC, the second important international bank still has an 
significant position (rank 6) in the Brazilian banking sector, after purchasing banks like Bamerindus 
and Lloyds (Paula 2011: 148). 
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processing (CPDs) stimulated the increasing automation and informatization of the 
banking sector (Jinkings 2002: 112). As already mentioned above, one of the most 
striking characteristics of the Brazilian financial market prior to the 1994 reform was 
hyperinflation. This incentivized an extremely comprehensive orientation to automation 
as one of the main rationalization strategies in the 1980s and 90s (besides outsourcing 
as a second main rationalization strategy which I will explain in detail below). The 
recourse to information technology enabled a daily update of bank accounts and 
financial transactions which evidently, especially under conditions of inflation, is an 
important instrument for saving time and costs (Pereira and Crivellari 1991: 100). This 
did not only change the material foundation of bank work: the handling of banknotes, 
which was, as highlighted by Nise Jinkings (2002) “replaced by electronic impulses 
originated in a computer memory” (Jinkings: 375, own translation). It also initiated 
the most dramatic job loss in the history of Brazilian bank work, aside from other 
restructuring effects and outsourcing (which strongly came into effect some years 
later). As shown in Table 1, the number of bank workers was almost been halved in the 
1990s.5 More recently, due to economic growth in Brazil there was a partial recovery of 
bank jobs up to half a million bank workers in 2011.
Table 1: Evolution of Employment in the Brazilian Banking Sector
Year Number of directly employed bank workers
1986  Approx. 1,000,000
1990 732,217
1995 558,692
1999 392,869
2010 483,097
Source: own compilation, Segnini 1998; Sanches 2006; DIEESE 2012a, based on dates from the 
Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS) by the Brazilian Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego (MTE).
Automation also changed the profile of productive operations (and also service relations 
– see below), as low-skilled work was largely eliminated and substituted by the use 
of information technology. This did not only have an impact on gender relations, as 
such (low paid) workplaces predominantly had been occupied by women (see further 
remarks about gender division of labor in section 3.2. about “Relations in Production” 
below). Informatization changed the work environment of all parts of the bank and 
5 In the same time banks counted on a sevenfold increase of profits (Sindicato dos Bancários 2011), 
see also the next section 3.1.3. in this paper.  
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changed hierarchies as well as modes of control. This led to contradictory effects: 
on the one hand qualification requirements increased and bank workers increasingly 
turned into multiskilled, flexible quasi-entrepeneurs with responsibility for productivity 
(sales of financial service products) and the quality of services. On the other hand, 
they suffered a substantial intensification of work and a devastating regime of variable 
remuneration depending on individual performance, but without further autonomy or 
participatory elements of work organization. This points to a reorganization of bank work 
which is shaped by an exclusively market-driven orientation (cf. Jinkings 2006: 197) 
and by the revitalization of Taylorist principles at the same time.6 Pereira and Crivellari 
(1991) refer to the latter with the term “bank-factory” (Pereira and Crivelari: 100) which 
emerges as a consequence of changing conditions for capital accumulation of banks 
and the comprehensive implementation of information technology. As a result, they 
identify a changing division of labor inside banks which is marked by the separation of 
front office (the branch offices of the banks) and back office work. Activities related to 
the back office have been further concentrated in big centers for data processing. This 
enabled significant scale effects and also a spatial concentration of bank work Pereira 
and Crivellari 1991: 103). 
The further liberalization of the Brazilian financial system in the course of the 1990s 
entailed an extensive adoption of the dynamics and ideology of a flexible and finance-
led regime of accumulation. This required adjustments not only of organizational 
structures what reflects in the formation of big financial holdings, cf. Sanches and 
Davanҫo 2010), but also the adaptation of international benchmarks. On this new 
fundament and since inflation gains were not viable any more, banks, respectively 
the new financial holdings, had to find new modes of securing profits (Carneiro 2010). 
The orientation to “shareholder value” gets to the heart of this finance-led dynamics. 
Ricardo Carneiro emphasizes the new significance of interest rates as the parameter 
for remuneration of capital and as an immediate benchmark for the return on productive 
activities: 
What has been a mediate goal or a strategy of enterprises – the attainment of a 
profit rate superior to the interest rate – has now become a decisive criterion for 
their operation, because a mismatch of this goal would reduce their share value 
listed at the stock markets (Carneiro 2010: 40, own translation). 
This logic has accelerated processes of mergers, acquisitions and privatizations 
but according to Carneiro also a dynamic of specialization and concentration on 
core activities, generally those which require a significant deployment of technology 
6 The coincidence of these features points to fundamental characteristics of what I call neotaylorist.
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and offer higher profit earning capacity. The other side of that coin and a direct 
consequence of financialization is, as he highlights, outsourcing and subcontracting 
of all other kinds of activities (Carneiro 2010). This is definitely an important finding in 
relation to the general impact of the dynamics of finance-led accumulation. However, 
the process of concentration and centralization discussed here goes along with a 
significant redefinition of the profile of the operative business of banks. This includes 
a new orientation to capital markets and an unprecedented level of purely speculative 
activities, a new diversification of financial services and the development of a series of 
new financial products (Jinkings 2004: 211-212, quoted from Coutinho 2011: 129). Thus, 
diversification on the one hand involves a virtually unleashed process of outsourcing 
and subcontracting on the other hand which goes much beyond simple decisions of 
externalizing less qualified and less strategic activities. The complementary relationship 
between the concentration on core business and outsourcing therefore seems to be 
more complicated and complex as outlined by Carneiro. For this reason, we will now 
have a closer look at outsourcing in the Brazilian Financial Sector, which must be 
considered one of the most important factors for the ongoing transformations of the 
sectoral profile, besides automation and changes in corporate governance.
3.1.3. Outsourcing as a Fundamental Strategy of Restructuring
As mentioned above, automation led to a drastic loss of bank jobs. However, Brazilian 
banks benefitted significantly from the recovery of the Brazilian economy in the last 
years, what is reflected by a new expansion of employment in the sector up to nearly 
half a million bank workers in 2010. Fuelled by extremely high interest rates, the banks 
registered record net incomes which according to FEBRABAN,7 the Federation of 
Brazilian Banks, amounted to R$ 54.3 billion (approx. € 23 billion) in the fiscal year 
2010, an increase of 25.6% in relation to 2009 (FEBRABAN 2011a). For the period 
between 1994 and 2010 the Bank Workers Union in São Paulo estimates an exorbitant 
increase of net incomes of the eleven biggest Brazilian banks of 1.069 % (Sindicato dos 
Bancários 2011). In relation to the evolution of employment in this period it is safe to say 
that the partial recovery of jobs mentioned above is much less than could be expected 
from this economic success. One of the main explanations for this discrepancy is the 
growing orientation to outsourcing since the early 90s, one of the major strategies of 
bank restructuring. Figure 1 shows the growing expenditure of banks for outsourcing 
in the period between 1999 and 2010. 
7 FEBRABAN = Federação Brasileira de Bancos.
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Figure 1: Real Growth of Expenditure of Brazilian Banks for Outsourcing 
(in Billion R$, deflated)
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Source: Sindicato dos Bancários 2011, based on financial reports of banks.
The expenditures have grown from R$ 2.2 billion to R$ 10.5 billion in 2010 with a 
clear tendency to further increase (Sindicato dos Bancários 2011: 4). This reflects 
the fact that outsourcing as a central strategy gained momentum only in the course 
of the last decade. But for a better comprehension of the logic behind that strategy, 
a more detailed analysis in relation to forms and targets of outsourcing is needed. 
Banks started to implement outsourcing as a strategy already in the beginning of the 
1990s. In line with Carneiro’s argument above, by that time outsourcing still referred 
to services which easily could be externalized, like staff restaurants, cleaning, janitor 
and security services – the latter a very important and specialized service as it includes 
the transport of checks, banknotes and documents. In a subsequent second period 
beginning with the end of the 90s banks did not only intensify outsourcing but began 
to outsource activities to a great extent which can be considered core businesses. 
These include check clearance, data processing, cash management, credit cards, 
opening of bank accounts, cash withdrawal or remittance, debt collection, customer 
registry, preparative steps for credit accommodation, canvassing, fraud prevention 
and corruption, services related to automated teller machines, IT support and above 
all customer services in call centers (Sindicato dos Bancários 2011; Sanches 2006; 
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own interviews). This (still incomplete) list of activities indicates that outsourcing goes 
to the very heart of bank work, which means the outsourced workers are doing the 
same basic activities as bank workers. Still, we can distinguish the following forms of 
outsourcing: 
(1) Outsourcing of defined sections of work inside banks. In this case, subcontracted 
workers are working next to permanent staff inside the bank’s own building. As this 
arrangement has been subject of several political as well as legal conflicts, banks 
reduced and almost abandoned this form of outsourcing (own interviews in April 
2012 at Sindicato dos Bancários, São Paulo). 
(2) Assignment for the execution of specific internal tasks through a third party 
organization (subcontractor). In this case the subcontracted workers are working 
outside the bank in the subcontractor’s own physical space.
(3) In addition, there is a third form of outsourcing which differs in various aspects: 
the so called correspondente bancário – in the following referred to as “bank 
correspondent”. It emerged in the context of a public discussion and several political 
respectively regulatory measures to improve the availability of bank services all 
over the country. As a matter of social inclusion, bank correspondents should help 
to improve the “bancarization” (the expansion of banks to regions without bank 
branches). In 2003, under the Lula government, the Central Bank therefore further 
liberalized the awarding of concessions as bank correspondents to establishments 
as diverse as the Banco Postal and lottery retailers (Coutinho 2011: 150), but 
also to supermarkets, drugstores, departments stores, shops, petrol stations, 
newsstands, etc. Actually, the intended effect was by no means achieved; on 
the contrary, an uncontrolled growth of bank correspondents was set in motion. 
According to the Federation of Brazilian Banks FEBRABAN, the number of bank 
correspondents reached 161,000 in 2011 (FEBRABAN 2012), an impressive figure 
which corresponds to an increase of 68% between 2007 and 2011 (CONTRAF 
2011: 10). Interestingly, this increase does not apply to needy regions with a scarce 
provision of bank services but rather to regions like São Paulo which already have 
the highest concentration of bank branches in Brazil. The implementation of bank 
correspondents has therefore been strongly criticized by the Confederation of the 
Bank Workers Union CONTRAF8 as well as by Grijalbo Coutinho, a labor court 
judge since 1992. Both labeled the implementation of bank correspondents as 
a large-scale outsourcing-strategy, hidden behind a misleading public discourse 
about “bancarization” and social inclusion. Coutinho (2011) even speaks of violation 
8  CONTRAF = Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores do Ramo Financeiro
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of human rights through the Central Bank by which he addresses the problem of 
deregulation of labor relations related to the emergence of bank correspondents. In 
fact, correspondents are bank workers without even having a notion of being one. 
They are affiliated to diverse sectors and enterprises, working for example as low 
paid saleswomen in a department store. Their labor contracts are not subject to the 
regulations and collective agreements of the banking sector but (if existent) of other 
economic sectors and other trade unions. There is no detailed information about 
working and employment conditions of bank correspondents available, but it can 
generally be assumed that they do not in the least reach the standards regulated for 
bank workers. Ultimately, this kind of precarization of labor standards is a problem 
for all subcontracted workers. 
Apart from the bank correspondents, the most important and recent wave of outsourcing 
was realized in relation to call centers, which indicate a new form of customer relations 
and the related services. At the same time, activities like check clearance and other kinds 
of back-office work which have been main target of the first big wave of outsourcing of 
core activities of banks (cf. Sanches 2006) have become less important in the last few 
years due to the ongoing automation and informatization which more and more reduce 
manual work and the deployment of manpower. 
3.1.4. A New Economy of Service Relations and the Social Segmentation of 
 Customers
The new orientation to investments in call centers expresses a fundamental change 
in the character of services and customer relationship of banks in various aspects. 
According to the annual report of the Federation of Brazilian Banks (FEBRABAN 2011a) 
we can reconstruct different channels for customer relations and the provision of bank 
services. Here again, automation had a fundamental impact, as today a big part of bank 
customers do not need any physical bank employee to carry out daily tasks like cash 
withdrawal, transfers or payments. This is confirmed by the remarkable increase of 
electronic bank branches (and other establishment like shopping malls etc.) equipped 
with ATMs (automatic teller machines). Moreover, banks intensified the use of internet 
banking and mobile banking as the most recent form of rationalizing and computerizing 
bank business (see Table 2). Actually, electronic banking does not simply replace 
former manual work steps by technology, but integrates the customer into production. 
This means that customers themselves fulfill tasks which formerly have been handled 
by bank workers. This can be perceived as a specific kind of outsourcing of bank work 
to the customers themselves, what also means a flexibilization of boundaries or, as 
Franҫois Hubault puts it: “Where ends the customer, where begins the company?” 
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(Hubault 2011: 131). The same is true for call centers as another new form of customer 
relationship. At the same time, it implies a deep cultural change in society as it imposes 
and presupposes a comprehensive knowledge and ability in handling computers, 
information technology and the administration of bank accounts. It is noteworthy that 
until the 1980s even in internationalized sectors like the automotive industry workers 
still received their wages in cash – the money was brought to the company by courier 
service (Silva 2000: 88). 
Table 2: Channels for Customer Services and Forms of Bancarization
Year/Number 2000 2004 2007 2010 2010/2000
Bank branches 16,369 17,260 18,572 19,813 21.0 %
Traditional 
branch offices
9,495 9,856 10,555 12,670 33.4 %
Electronic 
branch offices
14,453 25,595 34,669 45,087 311.9 %
Bank Correspondents 13,731 46,053 95,849 165,228 1,203.0 %
Internet Banking
(million customers)
8.3 18.1 29.8 37.8 455.4 %
Mobile Banking
(million customers)
2.29 100.0 %
Call Centers
(billion numbers 
of calls)
1,294 1,151 1,319 1,606 24.1%
Bank accounts 
(active and non-active 
in million units)
63.7 90.2 112.1 141.3 121.8 %
Credit Cards
(million units)
29.0 53.0 104.0 153.0 527.6 %
Savings account
(million units)
45.8 67.9 81.1 97.2 112.2 %
Financial transactions
(trillion R$)
19,759 30,034 41,059 55,718 281.9 %
Source: FEBRABAN 2011, Relatório Anual 2010; Feltrim, Ventura and Dodl 2009 (own compilation). 
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Today, and this is another remarkable development, the majority of Brazilian citizens 
has a bank account. According to FEBRABAN (2011a) between 2000 and 2010 there 
was an increase of more than 120% up to a number of 141.3 million bank accounts. 
Similarly impressive is the number of 153.4 million credit cards in 2010 (FEBRABAN, 
see Table 2).9 This points to adjustments in the structure of the social space of the 
Brazilian society with respect to the social stratification which caused broad debates 
about the emergence of a new middle class in the last years. Due to the improved 
economic performance and the subsequent fall of poverty rates the Fundaҫão Getulio 
Vargas (Neri 2010) ascertains shifts in the composition of social classes which are 
classified and ranked from A (highest class) to E (lowest class). According to Marcelo 
Neri, the most significant changes can be noted in relation to the famous “C-class” – 
29 million people entered this new middle class between 2003 and 2009 which now 
accounts for more than half (50.5 %) of the Brazilian population (2010: 4). In relative 
terms, the upper class has been growing even more: Neri indicates a growth of 30.6 % 
for “class A” and “B” in the same period, what corresponds to the “incorporation of 6.6 
million people, reaching 20 million Brazilians (approximately 10.5 % of the population)” 
(Neri 2010: 5). Conversely, the population assigned to the lower “classes D” and “E”, 
which form the base of the pyramid, fell from 96.2 million to 73.2 million (which still 
represents a considerable part of the Brazilian population living under conditions of 
poverty), underscoring upward social mobility. The new middle class is of extreme 
political as well as economic importance, “because it concentrates over 46.24% of 
the total Brazilian purchasing power during 2009” (Neri 2010: 7). This development is 
closely related to an increase of income, mainly due to the growth of formal employment 
as well as the social policy of the Lula-government which implemented transfer 
programs like Bolsa Família (Family Grant) – what contributed to the integration even 
of lower classes (D and E) as bank customers. The Fundaҫão Getulio Vargas therefore 
comes to the conclusion that “Brazil is becoming a nation of consumers, buying cars, 
computers and houses with cash or on credit” (Neri 2010: 10). 
Even though it is justifiable to question this overly simplified picture and identify new 
segmentations as well as old and new lines of inequality, the message of the quoted 
sentence is also evident in the data in Table 2. The development of bank accounts, 
savings accounts and credit cards for instance directly reflects the increased inclusion 
into the formal labor market or into conditional cash transfer programs by the state – this 
requires a bank account for the payment (these payments are generally administrated 
by the Caixa Econômica Federal, one of the big public banks). The depicted increase 
of purchasing power is furthermore reflected in the impressive increase of financial 
9 FEBRABAN indicates 145,382,000 adults over 15 in the Brazilian population, from which 115,187,000 
have an active relationship with financial institutions (FEBRABAN 2011b)
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transactions in general. Still, we can assume that behind that reconfiguration of the 
social space new forms of segmentations can be identified. This becomes visible in 
the strategy of banks in relation to the treatment of customers which are classified 
according to their purchasing power and investment capability (see Figure 2). Part 
of this strategy is the dedication of determined physical spaces to specific customer 
groups. All big banks created such dedicated spaces for private customers with an 
elevated purchasing power, that is to say for customers classified “class B”. In the case 
of Bradesco these special bank branches are called “Prime”, Banco do Brasil named it 
“Seu Estilo”, while Itaú uses the term “Personalité”. As a general orientation customers 
classified “class C” should use the standard bank branches (security personnel prevent 
them from entering branches for classes A or B) whereas customers classified “class 
D” and “E” are expected to utilize the services provided by bank correspondents. 
Figure 2: Customer Segmentation Pyramid: The Case of Bradesco
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Source: Adaptation from Sanches and Davanҫo 2010 (based on the Annual Report, Bradesco 2008).
This is reflected by statements in several of my interviews like: “underclass wearing 
flip-flops may not enter a bank branch”, an entry condition which is enforced through 
the presence of security personnel inside the branch – often not by direct interventions 
but by disapproving looks and subtle but clear social intimidation of people wearing 
flip-flops. This is a very important point because it shows how strategies of individual 
banks (as part of “relations in production”) reproduce the “relations of production”. 
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Their strategies are not only reflecting the changing social stratification in the society, 
but also produce and shape it. The classification of bank customers also translates 
into the classification of social classes and groups which are not only equipped with 
economic but also with cultural, social and symbolic capital. In our example, the way 
people are prevented from using a bank branch dedicated to a higher ranked customer 
group also can be interpreted as a form of symbolic violence which reproduces power 
relations expressed in social stratification. 
As already mentioned, however, the general strategy of banks is to reduce costs for 
the operation of physical bank branches through the development of other channels 
like ATMs, Internet banking, mobile banking etc. Still, one of the most important 
rationalizations of the (quasi-) direct contact with customers are call centers which 
allow to reduce costs by physical concentration and decentralization at the same time. 
Again, information technology is enabling this new form of customer relationship. A 
call center does not necessarily have to be in the same physical environment as a 
bank; this is one of the conditions which enabled an extremely comprehensive wave 
of outsourcing. The result is a very complex combination of strategic importance for 
customer acquisition and retention on the one hand and a large-scale-program to 
rationalize customer relations and reduce its costs on the other hand, for example 
by preventing customers from going to a physical branch but rather having them use 
the telephone. Before we have a closer look at the organization of the labor process 
inside bank-owned as well as in subcontracted call centers (“relations in production”), 
I will reconstruct the emergence of call centers in the course of the development of 
telemarketing as a new branch which is intimately connected with the banks own value 
chains. 
3.1.5. Flexibilization of Sector Boundaries – The Case of Telemarketing
Call centers have become a crucial instrument for the management of customer 
relations which enables the handling of higher number of customers as well as of 
diversified and commodified financial services. Call centers (and contact centers) have 
themselves been the subject of reorganization inside the banks – all of which have one 
or very few centralized internal call centers, but most of the call center infrastructure 
was targeted for a large-scale outsourcing to companies in the telemarketing sector. 
In principle, the use of the telephone for commercial purposes has a longstanding 
tradition also in banks as well as the telephone operator as a corresponding (female) 
occupation. But, telemarketing – the common term in Brazil which refers to all forms of 
customer relations, especially sales, through telephony, emerged in the end of the 1990s 
in the course of the liberalization and privatization of telecommunication (1997/98) 
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and the technological diffusion of Internet and telephony. Both political deregulation 
and technological changes led to an enormous dissemination of telephone lines and 
mobile phones – the technological precondition for call centers and the formation of 
telemarketing as a new, and one of the most recent economic sectors in Brazil. 
According to the Brazilian Association of Company-Customer Relations (ABRAREC)10 
in the last decade the sector has grown with a rate of 200%, in 2011 sales accounted 
for RS 26 billion which corresponds to 3% of Brazil´s GDP (ABRAREC 2012). Most of 
the telemarketing companies originate from start-ups; the new sector, however, did not 
only grow explosively but also became concentrated at an early stage of its existence. 
As a result the field of telemarketing is dominated by a few big players: Contax is 
the biggest company, a Brazil-based multinational, stock market listed enterprise 
with about 115,000 workers (in 2012), making it the second largest private company 
in the country. The second largest in the telemarketing sector is Atento, a Spanish 
multinational with more than 85,000 workers in Brazil (own interviews, 2012). Most of 
the companies describe themselves as specialized in business process outsourcing 
(BPO), which refers to the outsourcing of specific business functions or processes. 
Originally developed in the manufacturing sector, BPO has been diffused on a large 
scale in the services sector and includes back-office functions (like human resources, 
accounting or finance) as well as front office functions, primarily contact centers 
and customer relationship management (CRM). In relation to contact (or call) center 
services, the Brazilian telemarketing sector according to ABRAREC (2012) employs 
approximately 1.4 million workers who attend the impressive number of 1.5 billion calls 
per month. Not surprisingly, Brazil – along with India and the Philippines – is one 
of the biggest markets for call centers worldwide, but also part of a worldwide and 
astonishing simultaneous development of the call center industry (Batt, Holman and 
Holtgrewe 2007). Actually, the emergence of call centers can only be understood in the 
context of deregulation and liberalization of globalized economies. 
The call center industry has frequently been lifted up as a paradigmatic example for the 
globalization of services. In fact, it points to the decoupling of material and immaterial 
production processes as a consequence of a new regime of finance-led accumulation. 
Based on the implementation of information technology, a dematerialization and 
acceleration of economy can be noted which is driven by an increased pressure to 
reduce time and costs. Service work, perceived as immaterial work creates a new 
interface between production and consumption and here indeed call centers are an 
important cutting point. The process of decoupling of material and immaterial processes 
also explains the reorganization of value chains which can be described as a process 
10 ABRAREC = Associaҫão Brasileira Das Relaҫões Empresa Cliente.
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of fragmentation and recomposition. Outsourcing is a fundamental part and strategy 
in this process, and as a result, formerly separated value chains appear to be now 
interconnected. Brazilian telemarketing companies provide services to contractors 
from the most diverse economic sectors like telecommunication (mobile phone and 
internet provider), media, retail sales, financial services, public services, food industry, 
health services and manufacturing (Oliveira 2005: 13). It is not by chance that the 
financial sector is one of the most important contractors of call center services in Brazil 
– according to ABRAREC 60% of the above mentioned 1.5 billion calls a month can be 
associated to the financial sector. That means, there is a very considerable intersection 
of the value chain of banks and insurance companies on the one hand and that of 
telemarketing, equally dominated by global players. As a result, sector boundaries are 
not fixed any more, but becoming increasingly flexible. There is no clear new sectoral 
demarcation line as outsourcing decisions depend on a variety of factors. Thus, it is 
important to note, that outsourcing, even if we consider it to be a direct outcome of 
restructuring of corporate governance in the light of financialization, does not serve 
as a mechanical explanation. The variation of outsourcing decisions and the concrete 
forms of realization in the researched cases demonstrates the dependency on social 
and power relations, political regulation, forms of resistance, ideologies, ideas, beliefs 
and perceptions which have become hegemonic. This is also confirmed by the findings 
of the Global Call Center Project: 
The mobility of call center operations has led many to view this sector as a 
paradigmatic case of the globalization of service work. And we find that the 
call center sector looks quite similar across countries in terms of its markets, 
service offerings, and organizational features. But beyond these similarities, we 
find that call center workplaces take on the character of their own countries 
and regions, based on distinct laws, customs, institutions, and norms. The 
‘globalization’ of call center activities has a remarkably national face. (Batt, 
Holman and Holtgrewe 2007: V).
This indicates a complex interconnection of spatial dimensions and points at the same 
time to the importance of locally embedded negotiation processes. Transnationalization 
changes conditions for these local regulations and struggles. The call center industry 
is a good example for this complex relationship also because most of the services are 
provided for domestic markets and not, as many may have expected, internationally 
as offshore-activity. According to the Global Call Center Project 86% of the call centers 
serve the local, regional, or national market in their own country. With about 98%, this 
percentage is even considerably higher in Brazil (Batt, Holman and Holtgrewe 2007: 
16).
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3.1.6. Relations of Power and Industrial Relations
The flexibilization of sector boundaries has a drastic impact on traditional forms of 
labor market regulation. Specific branches have been the fundamental framework in 
the past century for the organization of the economy and the respective actors. This 
is reflected for example in public statistics which refer to the framework of a branch, 
industrial policy and the definition of norms, laws, standards, instructions etc. referring 
to specific economic activities assigned to specific branches as well as the formation of 
organizations like employers’ associations and workers’ trade unions. That means that 
formal labor markets are founded on the delimitation of specific economic branches with 
a corresponding system of collective bargaining and collective agreements which are 
part of the regulation of labor/industrial relations. Large scale strategies of outsourcing 
therefore undermine existing frameworks of this kind of regulation. Since one of the 
main motivations for outsourcing is to reduce costs, especially labor costs, it is evident 
that outsourcing normally includes a shift from high regulated to low regulated branches 
with lower wages and less codified rights. This implies a massive tendency towards 
deregulation based on a significant shift in the relation of power between employers 
and trade unions worldwide. 
This is also the case in the Brazilian banking sector where the bank workers unions are 
relatively strong and militant. Beside the automotive industry, it ranks among the most 
advanced and regulated sectors in the Brazilian formal labor market. The history of bank 
workers unions in Brazil goes back to 1923, when the first union was founded in São 
Paulo. In the end of the 1970s – the last years of the dictatorship – opposition groups 
in the union played an important role in the fight for independent trade unions and for 
political freedom. In spite of strong repression by the dictatorship they organized strikes 
and manifestations in various cities and regions. As part of the “novo sindicalismo” they 
contributed significantly to the foundation of the new Trade Union Confederation CUT11 
in 1983, and it was in the same period when also the national financial capital established 
its own political representations, like FENABAN12 and FEBRABAN (Jinkings 2002: 273). 
As part of FEBRABAN, the Federation of Brazilian Banks, FENABAN functions as the 
employer’s syndicate which represents the banks in the process of national collective 
bargaining – as opposed to CONTRAF (Confederation of Bank and Financial Workers, 
affiliated to CUT). In 1992 the Confederation of Bank Workers CNB was founded as the 
first national representative organization of bank workers. CONTRAF is the successor 
organization of this confederation founded in 2006 and a very interesting attempt to 
react to the reorganization of the financial sector: CONTRAF represents not only bank 
11 CUT = Central Única dos Trabalhadores
12 FENABAN = Federação Nacional dos Bancos
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workers but also other kinds of financial workers in bank-dominated holdings. In terms 
of organizational success CONTRAF also stands out for being the only trade union 
organization in Brazil which is able to negotiate a national collective agreement. 
As an outcome of continuous struggles (with a strong base in the public banks) since 
the 1980s bank workers can count on relatively high wages, social benefits and 
above-average rights. It is possibly this context which could explain the extraordinarily 
comprehensive orientation to outsourcing in the Brazilian banking sector – as an 
offensive strategy of employers to limit the strong regulation and the influence of a 
historically strong trade union. Outsourcing, of course, is an extremely contested field, 
and not only in the banking sector but in the whole Brazilian society. This points to 
the problem that the legal basis for workers and business practices have become 
incoherent. In the first years of massive outsourcing, bank workers trade unions 
succeeded in protecting workers through legal interventions. Some banks were obliged 
to reemploy the outsourced workers (which in these cases mostly had remained in the 
same physical space but received less remuneration as contract workers than they 
had received as regular employees) as a consequence of judgments of the courts 
which ruled some cases to be the outsourcing of core activities (what in Brazil in 
legal terms is called atividade fim vs. atividade meio) what is legally forbidden (own 
interviews; Oliveira n.d.). Banks began to concentrate on outsourcing arrangements 
which could not invite such immediate legal interventions but actually it is an open 
and widely contested question, which kind of outsourcing can be considered in line 
with the current laws and regulations. The public dispute about opposing draft laws in 
the last months (one of them supported by several Confederations of Trade Unions, 
among them CUT) for the legal reregulation of outsourcing on the one hand points to 
the generalization of outsourcing across all sectors (Dau, Rodrigues and Conceiҫão 
2009), which goes beyond the current legislation. On the other hand, it emphasizes 
that this new dimension of outsourcing has already created a level of intersection and 
interconnection of different value chains which does not allow any more to distinguish 
clearly between core business and indirect/mediate activities. For that reason, it has for 
instance become uncertain, who is a bank worker and who is not? This question is of 
course central in the dispute between FEBRABAN and CONTRAF, but in effect, trade 
unions and even the Bank Workers Union of São Paulo which initially developed some 
important activities in relation to the organization of outsourced worker, have not been 
able yet to create sustainable strategies to include outsourced workers. The important 
step to integrate all workers of the financial sector (the big holdings which integrate 
banks, assurances, the stock exchange etc.) through the foundation of CONTRAF 
is not enough to encompass and comprise workers of other branches with a strong 
intersection with the banking sector such as telemarketing workers. One of the reasons 
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for this are not only the clear interests of the main economic and political actors on 
the employers side but also the political dispute about rights of representation among 
trade unions themselves. The Brazilian trade union system actually has high barriers 
which complicated this problem, which in our case express themselves in the fact 
that already at least four different trade unions (affiliated to different confederations) 
compete in the field of organization of the telemarketing companies in the municipality 
of São Paulo (own interviews; Braga 2012). Legally, there is no chance for the bank 
workers unions to enter this battle. As a consequence, outsourcing as well as the 
massive job cuts and the restructuring of work organization and individual performance 
regimes have affronted historically hard won rights of bank workers and increasingly 
weaken the base and position of their trade union representation. 
3.2. Relations in Production I
3.2.1. The Gender Dimension of Bank Restructuring – Entanglements of Relations in 
 and of Production
In terms of female participation the banking sector distinguishes itself from most other 
sectors in the Brazilian formal labor market through a high proportion of highly qualified 
women.13 This was not always the case – in public banks the first women were allowed 
to participate in the official application procedures (concurso público) in 1968, but only 
for low qualified jobs as assistant typists. The Banco do Brasil employed the first women 
only in 1971 (Santos 2007). The rising integration of women as bank workers coincides 
with the increasing participation of women into the formal labor market in general 
beginning from the end of the 1960s. In those times there was a strong discrimination 
of women in banks, as they could only apply for the less qualified and lower paid jobs. 
According to Jinkings (2002: 194) this could be interpreted as a strategy of banks to 
expand departments with low paid jobs like receptionists, telephone operators, cleaners 
and assistant typists via feminization, which would make sense if we analyze gender 
segregation in the context of the overall restructuring. Women became increasingly 
integrated as bank workers in the course of the above mentioned automation which 
also entailed the implementation of a new division of labor. The division between bank 
branches and Centers for Data Processing as well as the ongoing automation implied 
a rise of repetitive and standardized activities which do not require many qualifications 
(Lima et al. 2010). The female participation grew rapidly, from 36% of bank workers in 
the state of São Paulo in 1979 to 47.5% in 1992 (Jinkings 2002: 191) and in this period 
women predominantly worked in this kind of standardized and repetitive activities. 
13 In her study, Liliana Segnini (1998) emphasizes that not only in Brazil but in most banking sectors 
worldwide a feminization can be noted.
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Most of them worked in bank branches in activities related to customer services like 
receptionists or as clerical assistants, typists, check compensation and cash desk 
(Segnini 1998: 184, 117). Interestingly, the number of female bank workers fell in the 
following years what points to the drastic job cuts of less qualified work because of 
further automation and outsourcing – jobs which had been usually occupied by women 
(Segnini 1998; Santos 2007). However, the following turn of work organization towards 
market orientation, that means increasing sales of diversified financial products and 
services helped to reinstall women as an important and more qualified part of the labor 
force in banks. 
As women also before had been employed preferentially for customer-related services, 
this does not point to a fundamental turn of gender politics, but rather to continuity of the 
exploitation of sexual attributions and stereotypes. Even today, women are considered 
to be more patient, attractive, communicative, congenial, and so on, what seemingly 
renders them more suitable for this kind of work. At the same time, these qualifications 
are not valorized but associated with low wages and low social prestige. This kind of 
gendered division of labor can therefore be perceived as symbolic violence based 
on specific (sexist) gender classifications (Funder and Sproll 2012). The majority of 
women continue to work in such positions, many of them additionally in part time 
(Segnini 1998), what makes professional advancement and career prospects more 
difficult than for men. Nevertheless, some changes in gender hierarchies and gender 
relations in banks in the last years attract attention. Beginning from the 1990s women 
increased their participation in banks, up to a total share of female bank workers of 
48.48% in 2010 (DIEESE 2012b). At the same time, a significant increase in the level 
of education of bank workers can be noted (Figure 3; DIEESE 2011b):
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Figure 3: Level of Education of Brazilian Bank Workers 1995-2010 
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Source: DIEESE 2011b, own translation.
According to DIEESE, the number of bank workers with an academic degree has risen 
from 20.78% in 1995 to the expressive percentage of 68.57% and another 16.39% is 
currently in academic education. If we look at the distribution by gender, it is noteworthy 
that women actually demonstrate a higher level of education than men: The group with 
a university degree in 2010 is composed of 71.67% women and 66.52% men (DIEESE 
2012b). However, this does not translate in better or at least equal pay. Women’s 
remuneration is significantly lower with a monthly average of R$ 3,812 compared to 
R$ 5,02214 average remuneration of male bank workers (DIEESE 2012b). This finding 
suggests that the labor force of women in banks is used in a very specific way (activities 
like customer related services which are essentialized as feminine) and to relatively 
lower prices – that means, even on the base of risen qualification requirements (also) 
for women, traditional gender hierarchies are reproduced. Interestingly, private banks 
seem to have a more pronounced strategy referring to the use of high qualified but 
“cheap” female labor than public banks: the female share of employees in private 
banks is 53% in relation to only 43% in public banks (DIEESE 2012b). This can be 
explained by the different channels of recruitment. Public banks still have to apply the 
14 This corresponds to € 1,472 and € 1,939 respectively (exchange rate March 27, 2013).
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public application procedures (concurso público),15 whereas private banks according 
to DIEESE can realize such strategies more directly and rapidly. As a result, private 
banks employ more women, but pay them significantly less (R$ 3,486) than public 
banks, where women still are a minority but with a salary which is 23% higher (R$ 
4,298) (DIEESE 2012b). The example reveals on the one hand how the integration of 
the Brazilian financial sector into global value chains and the subsequent changes in 
qualification requirements impact on gender relations. On the other hand, it shows the 
restriction of bank strategies in relation to such adaptation because of public regulation 
like concurso público which differentiates recruitment policies in public and private 
banks. 
Another explanation for the gender pay gap in banks and related to the problem 
discussed above concerns the vertical allocation of positions. Women are still 
underrepresented in leading positions; however, beginning in the 1990s, women made 
some progress in relation to the occupation of positions like supervisors, operations 
managers and department directors (Jinkings 2002: 194, 195). The following table 
prepared by DIEESE (based on statistical data of the Brazilian Ministry of Labor 
and Employment, MTE/RAIS) shows the distribution of men and women in different 
positions/occupations and the respective remuneration in Brazilian bank institutions 
(instituições bancárias):
15 Public Banks often argue that recruitment based on concurso público is gender- and race-neutral 
and can´t be influenced by the banks own policy (own interviews, FEBRABAN). Actually, it can be 
assumed that the construction of recruitment tests and the type of requested and tested skills always 
implies gender-effects what most likely explains the underrepresentation of women in spite of their 
better level of education. 
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Table 3: Distribution of Positions/Occupations and Remuneration by Gender in 
Brazilian Bank Institutions (2010)
Position/Occupation Percentage 
of Women
Men Women
Number of
employees
Average
Remuneration 
(R$)
Number of 
employees
Average
Remuneration 
(R$)
Department 
Directors  
(Diretores)
19.09% 1,929 23,688.10 455 18,936.18
Operations 
Managers  
(Gerentes)
41.17% 29,867 7,451.75 20,902 5,659.55
Supervisors
(Supervisores)
49.37% 9,122 4,036.15 8,894 3,320.81
Clerical and 
Technical Assistants
(Escriturários e 
Técnicos Bancários)
47.22% 153,281 4,351.54 137,114 3,537.28
Professionals in 
Marketing and 
Consultants for 
Financial Services
(Profissionais de 
comercialização 
e consultoria de 
serviços bancários)
60.66% 16,947 4,971.18 26,135 3,992.18
(Administrative) 
Assistants
(Agentes, Assistentes 
e Auxiliares 
Administrativos)
60.87% 9,257 3,248.68 14,403 2,551.17
Telephone Operators
(Operadores de 
telemarketing e 
telefonistas)
71.57% 1,593 1,694.18 4,011 1,584.34
Others
(Outros)
45.31% 26,898 5,981.88 22,289 4,658.83
Total 48.48% 248,894 5,022.22 234,203 3,811.79
Source: DIEESE – Subseção CONTRAF/CUT (2012b).
      desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series No. 44, 2013 | 29
The table shows a relatively high proportion of women in executive positions, but most 
of them are located in a medium and low level (supervisors and operations managers). 
The share of women decreases the higher the respective position. Women are mainly 
concentrated in marketing, assistant activities and as telephone operators – that means 
in jobs with a low level of prestige and remuneration. The Brazilian banking sector in 
this sense confirms findings from diverse sectors and countries (cf. Funder and Sproll 
2012). But on the other hand, the share of 19.09 % of women in the position of director, 
even though with a significant difference in their remuneration (approx. 20% less than 
male directors), is rather amazing. Compared to the situation in the 1980s and 90s 
an above-average increase can be noted and one of the factors which contributed to 
this development is a political initiative which had to be taken up by the Federation of 
Brazilian Banks: the so called “diversity map”. 
3.2.2. The “Diversity Map” – Negotiated Entanglements of Gender, Class, and Race
This initiative in the first moment did not refer to gender but to racial inequality, which 
is even more striking and noticeable. A more detailed social profile of bank workers 
shows that 81% are white, but only eleven percent are black men, and the share 
of black16 women of seven percent is even less (FEBRABAN 2010: 31). The above 
mentioned data on university level of education furthermore points to the fact that bank 
workers belong to the social middle class. In addition, two thirds are between 25 and 
44 years old (FEBRABAN 2008). Data about the skin color of bank workers has not 
been available before the enquiries related to the diversity map. But organizations 
from social movements, particularly of the black movement, as well as the Bank 
Workers Union17 accused banks of racial discrimination and the disrespect of the ILO 
convention 111, which refers to discrimination related to employment and occupation. 
Encouraged by the protests, the Ministry of Labor and Employment and the Human 
Rights Commission of the Chamber of Deputies took legal action in 2003 to enforce 
banks to adopt programs for the promotion of racial equality. As a result, banks agreed 
to develop a program called “Valorization of Diversity”, which consisted mainly of a 
representative survey which was answered by 200,000 bank workers as well as a 
qualitative analysis of inequality and discrimination at the workplace. The research was 
16 With the term black I refer to the classification of race (negro) used by IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística). It distinguishes four categories: white, negro, indigenous and yellow. Negro 
summarizes all people who in the official census declared themselves as black or dark-skinned 
(pardo). This classification was also applied in the elaboration of the diversity map. In the last census 
in 2010 50.7% of the Brazilian population declared itself as black or dark-skinned, an increase of 6% 
(Lamarca and Vettore 2012).
17 This shows that the political program of the banking sector trade unions goes beyond classical 
themes like job security, wages, benefits, working hours and so on. It also refers to equal rights in 
relation to gender and race what reflects the influence and political struggles of the feminist and the 
black movement.
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conducted by CEERT (Centro de Estudos das Relaҫões de Trabalho e Desigualdades 
– Research Center for Labor Relations and Inequalities), an NGO which originated 
in the black movement. Part of the project was also the discussion and agreement 
of a concrete action plan. In 2008 the diversity map was published, representing a 
story of struggles and dialogues which resulted in the generation and access to data 
which have not been available before, in publications and publicity as well as several 
concrete programs in individual banks. But the outcome is modest in relation to concrete 
changes i.e. the number of black bank workers. 
In interviews, representatives of CEERT and trade union activists therefore expressed 
their disappointment also with FEBRABAN who did not agree to use all the data and 
results, particularly from the qualitative part of the research. FEBRABAN presents the 
diversity map as part of its social responsibility policy with a clear emphasis on the 
promotion of disabled persons. The related programs are undoubtedly very important 
and worthy but it makes clear that the Federation of Banks is not willing to push topics 
like racial and gender inequality further. This is also reflected in the reserved position 
in relation to a follow-up research.18 In interviews representatives of FEBRABAN 
furthermore emphasized that racial and gender inequality was not generated in banks 
but in society. Thus, they explain the low participation of women in high executive 
positions exclusively as a preference of women in their decision between career and 
family and reject any responsibility of banks for gender-aware internal recruitment 
and employment policies as well as the implementation of specific equal opportunity 
programs (this would be associated with “relations in production”). On the other hand, 
the diversity map had a visible impact on the increase of women’s participation in 
leading positions provoked by a new discourse as well as concrete programs in some 
banks like Santander (a private and the only foreign bank of the big five). Some of 
the activists who initiated the process of the diversity map interpret this development 
with some bitterness, since this success in relation to the promotion of women in 
leading positions refers to well educated white women, whereas very little success 
was achieved in relation to the promotion of black workers. This may also reflect the 
relatively small importance of racial issues in a trade union largely composed of white 
workers. In any case, it makes clear that social inequalities can only be understood 
if we distinguish different social groups and analyze intersections of class, race and 
gender.
18 In Interviews (May 2012) a representative of FEBRABAN asserted an increase of black bank workers 
of 4%. This statement is contested by CONTRAF as the empirical and methodological base for this 
data is unclear. A valid statement could only be made through a follow-up research with identical 
methodological framework, but although this had been part of the agreement, its realization was 
rejected by FEBRABAN.
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The diversity map is a very impressive example for the regulation and reproduction 
of social inequalities in the banking sector as a result of conflicts and negotiations, 
which can clearly be associated with “relations of production”. Due to the changing 
public discourse about racial inequality and the pressure of social movements, the 
state (concretely the Ministry of Labor and Employment) forced the banks (through 
their sectoral representation FEBRABAN) by legal action to respond the demands of 
the black, feminist and trade union movements. Actually, the result is not what could 
have been expected from the intensive process of research, dialogues, negotiations 
and agreements. The disappointing outcome corresponds to and reflects the existing 
relations of power. FEBRABAN on the one hand was forced to accede to the creation of 
the map, but at the same time the Federation was able to reframe the conflict as a form 
of symbolic politics which serves its own legitimation. This is partly possible because 
the state did not maintain (legal) pressure, as well as the trade union confederation 
did not insist in the compliance of agreements. But the whole process shows the 
significance of discourses as a means of power (what in Burawoy’s terminology is 
named an ideological apparatus) which is an integral part of the regulation of “relations 
in and of production”. In this sense, the diversity map appears as symbolic violence, 
because banks seemingly take steps against discrimination, whereas under the 
surface inequalities even increase. This is of course no linear, but a very complex 
and contradictory process which also resulted in some improvements like the rising 
participation of women in executive positions. However, due to the overall restructuring 
in the banking sector power relations worsen to the disadvantage of workers and their 
trade unions what is also reflected in the evolution of wages. It has already become 
clear, that the gender pay gap is considerable (in all positions in the vertical hierarchy), 
but a research of DIEESE shows, that wages in the banking sector are declining both 
for women and for men since 1995. In this period male remuneration has fallen 9%, 
a somewhat smaller drop than the loss of 12.7% for women. As a consequence, the 
gender wage gap has widened from 21 to 24 % (DIEESE 2011b). In this light, even the 
increase of women into higher positions appears ambivalent and embedded into cost 
saving strategies in relation to human resources.
Another fundamental problem is the limitation of the diversity map to the banking sector 
within its politically-defined traditional delimitations. No effort was made (not even by 
trade unions) to expand and use it as an instrument in interconnected sectors like 
telemarketing. If we compare the profile of bank workers with those in telemarketing, the 
contrast in terms of discrimination related to class, race and gender becomes evident 
(what will be detailed below). The contradiction could not be sharper: On the one hand, 
FEBRABAN legitimates itself through the discourse of diversity and on the other hand, 
social inequalities are aggravated through outsourcing as a main restructuring strategy 
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of banks. But this effect is not covered by the map of diversity and apparently nobody 
is able to assign the banks any responsibility for conditions at the moment. 
3.3. Relations in Production II – The Case of Call Centers
We will now have a closer look into work organization and social relations inside call 
centers, in a comparative view on internal call centers of the banks on the one hand 
and outsourced call centers of the telemarketing sector on the other hand which 
provide services for the banks respectively their customers. As already discussed 
above (3.1.4. and 3.1.5.), the liberalization of the banking sector and global as well 
as national restructuring of financial value chains led to an increasing importance 
of service relations. Diversified and complex packages of financial services are not 
only in the center of strategies for increasing productivity and customer retention, 
but also change work organization, forms of rationalization and modes of control and 
evaluation of (individual and company) performance (Tertre 2011). The centrality of 
immaterial and relational services which require the exploration of subjectivity have 
enforced neotaylorist modes of reorganization (Tertre 2011: 65-67). In call centers, 
these strategies become most visible, as this is the space where new forms of service 
relations are most institutionalized and subject of an informatics-based strategy of 
rationalization in order to achieve a maximum cost reduction. The following elaborations 
therefore focus on neotaylorist work organization and the correlated mode of control, 
the division of labor between external and internal call centers of banks as well as on 
the profile of the new work force in the outsourced call centers. Finally, I will discuss the 
changing images and identities as well as persisting inequalities related to call center 
work in the telemarketing sector. 
3.3.1. Neotaylorist Work Organization and Control of Immaterial Service Work
In general, the physical lay-out of call centers is very similar all over the world (Batt, 
Holman and Holtgrewe 2007). It corresponds to a work organization which by many 
scholars has been assigned Taylorist characteristics (Braga 2007; Matuschek, Arnold 
and Voß 2007; Venco 2006; Taylor and Bain 1999). This is also the case in Brazilian call 
centers: Centered on IT systems (Computer-Telephony-Integration) each telephone 
operator has an individual work station which is equipped with a headset and a 
telephone switch for the realization of inbound and outgoing calls and a computer 
which allows entering the bank system to access and change data of customers. 
The frequency of the calls is determined by the IT System and cannot be influenced 
by the workers themselves (Automatic Call Distribution, Interactive Voice Response). 
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During the call, operators generally have to follow a predetermined script, which limits 
their individual autonomy in the conversation and points to the high standardization 
which also refers to time: there are fixed target times which depending on the task and 
product can vary between 30-60 seconds or several minutes. This kind of standardized 
requirements both for behavior and performance of operators highlights characteristic 
features of a Taylorist work organization. This also becomes visible through the fact 
that most operators are only trained for a specific product (i.e. credit cards, loans/
credits, bank accounts, encashment, support/help desk, canvassing, assurances 
etc.), that means that work is divided into small steps and operators do not have any 
knowledge about the integral sequence of operation. Correspondingly, there is little 
training, especially in outsourced call centers. No professional training is required for 
recruitment, except completion of a secondary school education and some experience 
in the private use of computers. 
As mentioned above, the telemarketing sector has been growing very rapidly in a short 
time, which resulted in a very high demand of labor – large companies like Atento 
and Contax advertised hundreds or even thousands of vacancies at once and used 
different channels like their own Human Resource departments but also private and 
state agencies for recruitment. Several operators in my interviews reported that there 
were almost no recruitment tests in agencies; some reported the same for company-
internal recruitment procedures – what seems to be a consequence of the almost 
unmanageable number of positions to fill. But in general, companies mostly included 
tests in relation to the Portuguese language, basic knowledge in mathematics, 
communication capacities or aptitudes in relation to sales. Most companies used 
standardized psychological tests and methods. Once employed by the company, 
operators pass through a training program which includes general information on the 
company and the work environment and a specific training in relation to the product 
(which is the common term for the provision of a specific service). Depending on the 
complexity of the product the training takes between 7 and 30 days, but most of the 
interviewed operators had as little as 7-14 days.19 The next step is already situated 
at the workstation listening for one or two days to an experienced operator (and vice 
versa), and then the operator is already starting his or her job – inbound (receiving 
calls) or outbound (active contacting of customers). Hierarchies in call centers are 
rather flat. Usually, one supervisor is responsible for a group of about 20 operators, 
which also includes one or two monitors who are physically located next to the group. 
The next level is the coordinator who functions as an interface between the operation 
19 In several cases operators reported that representatives of banks themselves executed the training. 
In other cases, employees of banks had also been outsourced to the subcontractor to give instructions 
related to bank products/services. This reflects the judicial conflicts in relation to outsourcing, since 
direct instructions through the bank for outsourced workers could indicate a case of illegal outsourcing.
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and the customers (the banks, but also companies from other sectors). Coordinators’ 
offices usually are physically separated from the operators and they are reporting to 
an operations manager. 
IT systems allow the generation of metrics to measure productivity of a call center 
(this information furthermore can be accessed simultaneously by the customer – that 
is the bank, which demonstrates again the close interlacing between bank-own and 
outsourced activities in call centers. As human capital is central for the provision of 
services, this logic also includes very rigid systems of control. Electronic monitoring 
permits the recording and monitoring of call handling time, the number of customers 
attended per operator, start and end of work (when the operator connects/disconnects 
to the system), duration of breaks, etc. At the same time, the quality of the service is 
evaluated through monitoring by the supervisor or monitor who can connect any time 
to the call; the operator does not even know when and if a third person is listening to 
the call. This shows that call center workers are inserted into the “production process” 
like machines and submitted to an extremely rigid and authoritarian control regime.
 
Up to now the insight into the work organization, management methods and control in 
outsourced call centers reaffirms Taylorist characteristics which historically have been 
applied in industrial production, particularly on assembly lines. This also points to the 
industrialization of service work in the course of financialization and globalization (cf. 
Tertre 2011, Venco 2006, see also Lehndorff 2003). But the nature of service relations 
includes another quality which goes beyond traditional Taylorist forms of organization 
and instruments of domination: the outcome and quality of the product of the call center 
service is highly dependent on subjective capacities of the operator. The service is 
enabled through technology, but the main generator of productivity is the operators’ 
voice and communication capacity, thus his or her subjectivity. This implies that a 
very personal self-expression becomes a means of production itself. Call center work 
therefore implies a high demand for patience, good relationship with the clients (even 
when these are annoyed, impolite, complaining and ranting), empathy, appreciation, 
politeness, persuasiveness and related to these competencies: salesmanship is 
required. Sales form the basis of the new significance of service relationships of banks. 
All operators (as in general all bank workers), even those working inbound calls, are 
obliged to sell products, the so called “cross selling”. The operators must achieve 
predetermined targets referring to the sales of specific products. To give an example: 
an interviewed operator who is working inbound in the service related to credit cards 
of a specific bank reported that she had to offer life insurance policies to all calling 
customers, and the target was to sell 60 policies per month. 
      desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series No. 44, 2013 | 35
It becomes evident that the shape of work organization in call centers goes beyond 
the well-known features of Taylorist rationalization and control but combines these 
with the exploration of subjectivity (mental and emotional dispositions translated into 
economic output). It is this combination what I define as “neotaylorist”. Christian du 
Tertre (2011) uses the term in a similar way and identifies neotaylorist rationalization 
strategies as one possible response to insecurity related to the measurement of 
productivity of immaterial services. He understands neotaylorism as a rejection and 
negation of the specificity of the service relation, which includes the human, subjective 
factor. Neotaylorist strategies tend to reduce the identification of efficiency of services 
to measurable parameters like the number of attended customers, sold products or 
processed documents. Du Tertre speaks of perverse effects of such strategy in relation 
to the quality of the service as well as the recognition of employees and their position 
in the labor process. The correlated tendency to intensification of work induces a 
further deterioration of service quality and the professional status of workers (Tertre 
2011: 70). These remarks refer to bank workers in general, but according to my own 
research apply even more to the situation in outsourced call centers. Several workers 
reported for example their discontent with missing instructions what impacts negatively 
on their capacity to respond customers’ questions and advise them adequately. The 
standardized scripts as well as the high pressure in relation to the expected sales 
also generate another source of discontent: workers feel compelled to lie in order to 
achieve their targets and good results in the evaluation – a source for diverse diseases 
as described by Laerte Idal Sznelwar and Sejii Uchida (2011) and Rolo (2011). 
Achieving good results is not only an ethical aspect of work but also of existential 
importance because it is the precondition for receiving additional wage through variable 
remuneration. In an interview one of the human resources (HR) managers of a call 
center emphasized the necessity of additional incentives to achieve good results in 
sales. Actually, my findings point to a diversity of ways to cope with that problem. 
Several operators reported that it was almost impossible to meet the targets with the 
consequence that they never obtained the promised and desired additional income, 
some told about possibilities to manipulate IT systems in order to simulate results. This 
shows that even under almost complete formal control, workers find ways for gaming 
the system as described by Burawoy. Service work includes another imponderable 
dimension which was not taken into consideration yet, but is of an enormous importance: 
it always includes the customer as a third party in the relationship who plays an active 
role and thus becomes a co-producer of the service. This also impacts on the efficiency 
of a call center operator and on the quality of the service. The way in which service 
relations are organized in outsourced call centers cannot but compromise the quality 
of services – a well-known phenomenon by everybody who already hat to contact 
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such type of call centers. Banks apparently walk a fine line between maximizing their 
cost reduction strategies on the one hand and jeopardizing their market share and 
customer loyalty on the other hand (due to bad services). One explanation is the 
specific division of labor between internal and external call centers and, again, the 
correlated segmentation of customers. 
3.3.2. Division of Labor Between External and Internal Call Centers
Even though outsourcing of service relations is a generalized practice in the Brazilian 
banking sector it is noteworthy that all banks maintain own call center operations. 
Actually, if we compare work organization in these call centers with outsourced call 
centers it can be said that they do not differ fundamentally. However, although the 
differences may be quite gradual and slight, they are at the same time relevant and 
important: The work stations are a bit more spacious, the chairs a bit more comfortable 
and more ergonomic, workers have fewer problems to get permission to go to the toilet, 
the targets are a bit less aggressive and there is less stress and pressure because 
the personnel planning is a bit more generous (especially in the national private and 
public banks). This corresponds to the different status of internal telephone operators. 
Even though call centers also inside banks form a new segment of low qualification 
and remuneration and therefore operators are situated at the bottom of the banks’ 
hierarchy they can count on much more symbolic, economic, social and cultural capital 
than outsourced workers. The inclusion into a highly regulated sector not only provides 
more prestige but also a different material base. Outsourced call center operators 
receive a minimum wage (R$ 622, plus possible commission for sales), internal call 
center operators the basic wage of the banking sector (approx. R$ 1,400) as well 
as additional benefits fixed in collective agreements.20 Internal call center operators 
have to pass through the common recruitment procedures of banks which include the 
requirement of higher levels of education (at this stage workers do not necessarily have 
a completed academic education but are at least on the way to it). Furthermore the initial 
training program is not less than 30 days. This indicates the higher level of qualification 
not only of operators but also of the provided service. This corresponds to interview 
information from representatives of banks as well as of telemarketing companies in 
relation to the division of labor between internal and externalized call centers. On 
the one hand there is a considerable intersection of equal work and services in both, 
but banks concentrate services related to private and corporate customers of class 
A and B in special departments of their own operations. This seems to be the main 
differentiation which demonstrates the calculation of banks referring to the balance 
20 For a detailed comparative overview of income/benefits of bank workers and outsourced workers see 
Sanches 2006: 80-81. 
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of cost and quality. Another argument stated by most interview partners was that the 
handling of sensitive private data and the direct access to accounts would be reserved 
to internal call centers. In fact, several of the interviewed operators in outsourced 
call centers also reported to have access to bank accounts and all personal data of 
customers. In my interview, a spokesperson of FEBRABAN did not consider this as 
a problem because outsourced workers also had to sign confidentiality agreements 
about bank information. 
However, the line of labor division between internal and external call centers seems to 
be flexible and depending on different strategies of banks which also impacts on the 
profile of the employed labor force. The result is a complex process of segmentation and 
polarization which also becomes visible in changing gender, race and class relations. 
That means that the social profile of operators does not only differ between external 
and internal banks but also according to the strategic orientation of different banks. 
In my research I could differentiate three strategies which distinguish public, national 
private and foreign banks: 
(1) Firstly, the example of a public bank, the Banco do Brasil: As already mentioned 
above, public banks have to apply the concurso público for recruitment. As a result, 
the profile of call center operators does not differ from the general profile of bank 
workers as described above. 
(2) Secondly, the example of Bradesco, a national private bank: In this case, call centers 
form the general channel for recruitment of the bank. Most workers begin their career 
in the call center which also serves as a basic training center because operators get 
to know a variety of bank products and services and the bank hierarchy. The profile 
is different from the public banks workers are generally recruited while still young 
(first employment), most of them are white and belong to the social middle class, 
with a slight majority of women. Actually, Bradesco uses call centers for human 
resources development based on individual performance. Those who stand out 
with good performance get the chance to climb up the ladder in the hierarchy and 
can exit the call center (what according to interviewed operators signifies a strong 
incentive). The call center therefore also represents a space for qualification and 
socialization of new bank workers. Interestingly, and as a visible expression of the 
socialization function of Bradesco´s call centers, operators are obliged to respect 
the business dress code – although, as opposed to workers in a bank branch, 
telephone operators evidently are not visible to the customer. 
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(3) The third example of Banco Santander, a private foreign bank shows a very different 
strategy of recruitment. This bank does not use the call center as a main entrance 
to the bank and pursues the most aggressive strategy of outsourcing and cost 
reduction. As a result the profile of operators in Santander`s own call center does 
not differ from outsourced operators. 
3.3.3. The Profile of Outsourced Call Center Operators 
What exactly is the profile of outsourced call center operators? Most of them are very 
young, between 18 and 25 years old, and female: 84% of the operators are women 
(ABRAREC 2012) in comparison to a female share of 71.6% of telephone operators in 
banks (see table 3 and 4). Most of them live in poor neighborhoods in the periphery of 
São Paulo, which on the one hand also indicates their belonging to a lower social class 
and on the other hand – linked to this fact – a higher proportion of dark-skinned people. 
Race has always been a decisive factor for the structuring of social and economic 
inequalities in Brazil; correspondingly, more telemarketing workers are dark-skinned 
than bank workers (among whom white middle class prevails). It is not possible to quantify 
this statement further, because, as already discussed in relation to the “diversity map”, 
there is no systematic survey of race/skin color in relation to the racial segmentation 
of the labor market and also for the telemarketing sector there is no respective data 
available. This is directly related to the still prevailing invisibilization, stigmatization and 
social exclusion of dark-skinned and black people in Brazil. I refer to skin color, as this 
on the one hand is the base for the official census (see footnote 16) and on the other 
hand the connecting factor for the generation of stereotype classifications based on 
the phenotype (cf.  Bento  2008). This is also expressed by the discourse about race 
predominant in the banking and telemarketing sector (see further elaborations below). 
As already mentioned, only completion of secondary school is required for recruitment 
of telemarketing operators, but most of them are still university students and for many 
of them it is their first job – at least inside the formal labor market – and this is important 
as it guarantees some rights according to the labor law. Thus, due to the extremely high 
demand for telemarketing operators (as a consequence of outsourcing and the related 
development of a de-qualifying organization of service provision in call centers) in the 
last years, a specific social group has been integrated into the formal labor market 
whose employment opportunities in former times predominantly had been limited to 
the informal sector. This generates a very ambiguous situation. The access to the 
formal labor market and the work pass (carteira assinada) signifies a clear upward 
mobility which includes a number of rights and opportunities such as for example the 
ownership of a credit card – a symbol not only for consumption opportunities but also 
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for social integration as citizen. At the same time, these workers are included into a 
segment of the financial value chain which is characterized by low qualification, little 
reputation, and precarious employment conditions. Therefore, they are integrated into 
the new “middle-class-society”, but as a kind of second class-citizen, classified class D 
and E, that means they are equipped with little economic, social, cultural and symbolic 
capital. There is a relationship between this social classification and the extremely high 
turn-over rates in the telemarketing sector. According to ABRAREC (2012), 17% of the 
employment relationships last less than a year (some of the interviewed operators left 
the company just after few weeks or months). To give an example of the dimension: 
in December 2011 the multinational Atento contracted 8,200 workers and dismissed 
6,000 in the same month (interview with Atento´s director of labor relations). This can 
be explained by bad working conditions, low wages, the perception as occasional job 
(while studying), bad reputation, and few career opportunities. Nevertheless, many of 
them keep on working in call centers for years because there are no better employment 
opportunities. Another explanation points to the lack of attention to human resources 
development and the perception of workers as disposable. 
3.3.4. Recomposition of the Labor Force: Images, Identities and Persisting Inequalities
To understand the production and reproduction of inequalities related to gender, class 
and race in the banking/telemarketing sector we have to go beyond the analysis outlined 
so far. We also have to take in account the (self-) classifications of telemarketing 
operators which correspond to the noticeable depreciation also present in public 
discourses and comments. Telemarketing operators have a very different image from 
bank workers not only because of factors like education, social class, skin-color, and 
age but also because of their visual appearance and presentation. This is an outcome 
of the fact that a call center operator is not visible for the customer what impacts on 
strategies for recruitment. Thus, banks for example apply other criteria in relation to 
aesthetic stereotypes for contracting labor placed in a bank branch. It is an advantage 
to be white, pretty/handsome, well dressed etc., that is to say the applied criteria for 
recruitment point to hegemonic gender images and stereotypes (both for men and 
women). The image of telemarketing operators differs completely what was also 
expressed by themselves in my interviews: They described and declared themselves 
as negroes, ugly, obese, homosexual, transvestites, people with tattoos, piercing, 
belonging to subcultures, disabled etc. “Everybody gets in here, without discrimination” 
was a generalized statement made in a conspicuously uniform way by all different 
interviewees, be it the workers themselves, be it managers, representatives from 
employers’ organization or trade union activists. In this discourse, call centers appear 
as a space of unexpected equality and equal opportunity not hindered by belonging to 
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a (stigmatized) social group. Seemingly, gender, class, age, race, sexual orientation, 
etc. do not matter. This view was also confirmed by a statement of a representative 
of the sectoral organization ABRAREC who denied any discrimination i.e. related to 
race: “Call centers give an opportunity to those who want to have one. It is not skin 
color but your attitude which matters. It depends on you. Of course, there is a code of 
behavior. If you prefer to play in a band at night, you won´t get it” (interview April 2012). 
This statement highlights what I would define as core of the “illusio” (Bourdieu 1998b: 
100,101) of the field of telemarketing: The negation of discrimination and the idea that 
all depends on your individual performance. This is reinforced through a normative 
discourse on the universality of equality (Dölling 2004) which in Brazil also corresponds 
to current debates and recent policies in relation to anti-discrimination, diversity, quotas 
for black students, etc. as a normative obligation for a modern Brazilian society. 
The combination of such discourses and the evident but denied existence of 
discrimination and precarization is another expression of symbolic violence. In a 
contradictory process between self-attribution and discrimination on the one hand 
and a limited inclusion as (second-class-) citizens on the other hand telemarketing 
operators construct a new type of working-class identity which is marked by the 
permanent promise of social ascendance. This promise is fed by actually existing 
successful cases, but even without a statistical proof (which does not exist) it can be 
assumed that these are a minority. Nevertheless, in interviews all operators reported 
not to have noticed any gendered or racial division of labor on the level of operators 
(as for example the exclusive or predominant use of men or women for specific tasks 
like support or canvassing). This points to the fact that a distinctive use of labor on this 
level, which forms the bottom of the call center hierarchy, is not functional. At the same 
time there is a kind of unifying factor applied to all operators: the attributed inferiority. 
The majority of women is joined by a minority of men, who predominantly present 
characteristics like homosexual, transsexual and transvestite or black – attributes which 
are negatively classified in a society based on racism, sexism, heterosexual norms 
etc. and generate difficulties for these groups of people to access other segments of 
the formal labor market (Venco 2009: 60). Actually, restricted opportunities to obtain 
other jobs but telemarketing indicate discrimination, precarization and stereotypization 
which do not disappear in call centers but are reproduced on various levels. The 
considerable feminization related to telemarketing for example highlights a historical 
continuity. As already described above in relation to the banking sector, the occupation 
“telephone operator” – the predecessor of the modern call center operator – has 
always been conceived as feminine (Nogueira 2006: 49). This implies not only the 
attribution of stereotypes in relation to capacities like patience, listening to someone, 
and a sympathetic manner to treat customers (Venco 2009: 56). It is also linked to an 
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economic and social discrimination characterized through low qualification, repetitive, 
monotonous and low paid work. Call centers in this sense are a space where the 
former segments of low qualified female work inside banks have been transferred to 
and survive (Segnini 1998). 
Traditional lines of reproduction of inequality also become visible in vertical hierarchies. 
On the one hand, Table 4 points to fact that women are not only a majority as operators 
but are also surpassingly participating in leading positions. 
Table 4: Average Profile of Telemarketing Workers
Operator Monitor Supervisor Coordinator Operations 
manager
Average age 24 29 31 33 37
Women 84% 66% 73% 67% 50%
Average Wage R$ 691 R$ 1,267 R$ 1,623 R$ 2,674 R$ 4,779
Source: ABRAREC 2012.
66% of monitors who are usually recruited from the group of operators are female. 
73% of the supervisors are women and 67% of the coordinators (both supervisors and 
coordinators are at least partly recruited from the external labor market). But these 
shares, at first glance quite impressive, also show that women are not proportionally 
represented in leading positions (with the same share as operators). This can be 
interpreted as a reproduction of traditional gendered hierarchies (the higher the position 
the smaller the share of women), based on classifications and habitual dispositions 
which, in the game of competition, give advantage to men. In several interviews, this 
was legitimated by statements like: women are more likely to be absent because of 
menstruation, pregnancy, visits to the doctor, and so on. Many also emphasized the 
high number of single mothers. This indicates that also in telemarketing the gendered 
and hierarchical division of labor in the sphere of reproduction has an important impact 
on mechanisms of exclusion in the labor market (Nogueira 2006). At the same time, 
the young women interviewed working as operators emphasized that they imagine 
their future lives making a career and not as mothers and wives (“maybe later”). 
For black people and those with non-heterosexual identities the situation is even more 
disappointing in relation to the “illusio” (Bourdieu 1998b: 100, 101) of equality and 
 Sproll - Precarization, Genderization and Neotaylorist Work | 42
equal opportunity. There is no statistical data available, but several statements in my 
interviews point to the fact that blacks are less represented in executive positions 
and transsexuals and transvestites completely excluded. The latter are a particularly 
interesting example as they are considered to be very good operators and salesmen, 
thus more productive, creative, dynamic and engaged. One interviewee (a male 
monitor) said: “Transsexuals don’t get a chance for a career. That’s why they quit their 
jobs frequently and then try it in the next call center. They are looking for recognition 
and don’t get it” (interview April 2012).
4. Conclusions
In this paper I reconstructed a neotaylorist regime of service relations in the Brazilian 
banking sector as an outcome of the global restructuring of financial value chains. This 
finding illustrates the complex interrelations of inequalities of status, race, and gender 
with transformations in the banking sector. Based on a theoretical analysis referring 
to the concept of politics of production of Michael Burawoy and categories of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s social theory, different levels of (global, national and local) restructuring, 
negotiation, and regulation can be connected. The integration of the labor process 
into the analysis and the respective changes in work organization and control regimes 
furthermore enables insight into the interrelation of macro, meso and micro levels 
of conflicts and social relations. This theoretical approach therefore allows us to 
understand changes in power relations on the shop floor, the social recomposition of 
labor and resulting lines of inequality related to categories like gender, race and class 
in the view of a wider political, social, economic and transnational context. 
 
The Brazilian banking sector is one of the most important sub-branches of the services 
sector, which presents extraordinarily high growth rates and profits. At the same time, 
it ranks among the most regulated sectors of the Brazilian formal labor market also in 
terms of labor rights, wages, benefits, level of education as well as the high participation 
of women. This sector also demonstrates a highly comprehensive orientation to 
automation and outsourcing, one of the most striking strategies of restructuring since 
the 1990s. I therefore raised the question of how the profound restructuring impacts on 
re-distributional effects in terms of economic welfare (wages), social rights like access 
to formal labor contracts as well as gender and racial equality in the course of the 
ongoing social recomposition of the labor force? 
The empirical case outlined in this paper refers to call centers as one of the most recent 
targets for extensive outsourcing which points to an aggressive cost reduction strategy 
in relation to the (re-) organization of service relations. In the course of financialization 
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and the resulting diversification of financial products, the service relationship has 
gained importance for possible productivity increases of banks. Thus, activities being 
considered core business of banks have been outsourced in large scale to companies 
of another economic sector, the newly formed telemarketing branch. As a result, firstly, 
the delimitations of the respective sectors become unclear and flexible, a transformation 
which fundamentally undermines traditional forms and structures of regulation of labor 
markets and labor relations and in particular weakens trade unions and the hard-
won rights of the labor movement. Secondly, this process is directly connected to the 
neotaylorist reorganization of the labor process with respect to the service relation as 
immaterial work. Major characteristics of neotaylorism are the combination of a highly 
standardized and low skilled work process regulated through extremely authoritarian 
and rigid management and control (which are also typical characteristics of a Taylorist 
work organization) on the one hand and the dependency on and exploration of subjective 
capacities of the workers on the other hand (which differentiates neotaylorism from its 
origins in industrial assembly-line production). Thirdly, this cross-sectoral neotaylorist 
reorganization goes along with a social recomposition of the work force which includes 
changes in the profile of workers referring to education, age, gender, race, class, and 
sexual orientation. This is connected with a loss of economic, social, cultural and 
symbolic capital from the perspective of bank workers, but offers a limited social inclusion 
for the new telemarketing workers who formerly had been excluded from the formal 
labor market. Their profile can be summarized as mainly young, female, unskilled, 
dark-skinned, homosexual and part of other kinds of subcultures. Call centers are a 
space for a precarious, partial and contradictory inclusion and discriminatory exclusion 
of this new work force at the same time. The case of telemarketing is therefore a very 
outstanding example for the importance of identity as an integral part of labor politics. 
It appears as symbolic violence mediated through classification systems and habitual 
dispositions. 
This shows how the depicted process of global restructuring results in changes in 
the construction of identity and the social profile of the working class, a process 
which is embedded into a wider context of a heterogeneous and conflictive social 
and political transformation of the Brazilian society. These processes can only be 
understood by analyzing different interdependent and entangled dimensions, including 
the construction of identities in relation to class, gender and race. Both changes in 
the organization of the labor process as well as well as changing social structures 
referring to identities are therefore important features for the analysis of transnationally 
contextualized restructuring of labor markets and the respective redistributional effects 
which correlate to changes in the overall social structures of society. 
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